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GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN WISCONSIN*
MARY ALIcE HOiaMANN** AND JAMES W. DwYER***
That the law guards zealously the rights of minors and incompetents
is almost axiomatic. Legislators provide such protection in the form of
family codes,' children's codes,2 certain criminal statutes,3 liquor laws,4
statutes imputing minors' negligence to others,5 regulation of the rela-
tionship between a general guardian and ward,6 and a host of miscel-
laneous provisions. 7 Obviously, any statute relating to guardians ad litem
also manifests this concern.
Courts, too, have long recognized their duty to protect minor and
incompetent litigants." Protection of such nature has been traditionally
afforded by the appointment of one whose specific duty it is to safe-
guard the interest of his ward during the course of a given judicial
proceeding.9 Technically, one appointed in such capacity to represent a
plaintiff is called a next friend or prochien ami, while one so appointed
to protect a defendant is known as a guardian ad liten.10
The distinction has survived to the present day in Wisconsin statutes
regulating practices before justices of the peace. Section 301.21 pro-
vides that
an action instituted by a minor shall be dismissed (on motion of
the defendant) unless a next friend for him is appointed. When-
*This article is based upon a report submitted to the Wisconsin Judicial
Council, which instigated and authorized the study.
**B.S., Marquette University (1955); LL.B., Marquette University (1959);
assistant professor of law, Marquette University.
B.A., Marquette University (1962); candidate for LL.B. degree, Marquette
University (1965).1 Wis. STAT. chs. 245-48 (1963).2 WIs. STAT. ch. 48 (1963).
s E.g., Wis. STAT. §§940.32, 941.22, 943.35, 944.10, .11, 947.15 (1963).
4 Wis. STAT. §§66.054, 176.30 (1963).
5 Wis. STAT. §§167.10, 331.035, .048, 343.15 (1963).
6 WIS. STAT. ch. 319 (1963).
7 E.g., Wis. STAT. §§102.60 (double or treble damages for minor under work-
men's compensation), 175.20 (children under 17 not permitted in dance halls),
313.15 (allowance to minor children from parent's estate), 328.44 (children
under seven conclusively presumed incapable of negligence), 330.33 (tolling
of statutes of limitation during period of incompetency) (1963).
8 Montgomery v. Erie R. R., 97 F. 2d 289 (3d Cir. 1938); McReynolds v.
Miller, 372 Ill. 151, 22 N.E. 2d 951 (1939); Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v.
Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N.W. 50 (1910); The Queen v. Gyngall, [1893]
2 Q.B. 232; In re Spence, 2 Phil. Ch. 247, 41 Eng. Rep. 937 (1847); 43
C.J.S. Infants §105 (1945).
9 "As most fundamental among these [underlying principles] must be borne in
mind that the infant is always the ward of every court wherein his rights or
property are brought in jeopardy, and is entitled to most jealous care that no
injustice be done him. The guardian ad litem is appointed merely to aid and
enable the court to perform that duty of protection." Richardson v. Tyson,
110 Wis. 572, 578, 86 N.W. 250, 251 (1901).
10 City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sewell, 300 Ill. App. 582, 21 N.E. 2d 810
1939).
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ever requested the justice shall appoint some suitable person,
consenting thereto in writing, named by the plaintiff to act as his
next friend in the action....
On the other hand, section 301.22 provides for appointment of a
"guardian" for a minor defendant." But the guardian so required may
evidently be "any suitable person.""' Thus, the appointee selected to pro-
tect the rights of minor litigants in justice courts apparently need not
be an attorney, although a guardian ad litem must be an attorney, 3 in
both circuit 1 4 and county court15 proceedings.
Both the plaintiff's next friend 6 and the defendant's guardian,
are required to consent to their appointments in written statutory form. s
The guardian ad litem for only a plaintiff need consent in writing to a
circuit or county court appointment. 19
While there is no case law indicating that the situation has caused
any problem, justice court statutes make no provision for appointment
of a next friend or guardian for an incompetent litigantY° Sections
301.21 and 301.22 are specifically restricted to minor litigants. 2"
Nor do the statutes make any mention of fees for such next friends
or guardians.'2 But here, too, lack of any case law on the subject be-
speaks lack of a serious problem.
Especially in the light of the limited jurisdiction of justices of the
peace,23 and of the case of removal to county courts,2 4 most of the above
discrepancies appear to merit neither further attention nor revision.2'
Quite the opposite is true, however, of the problems surrounding
guardians ad litem in circuit and county courts in this state,26 with which
this report is primarily concerned. The following main points will be
considered: the necessity of guardians ad litem; the requirement that
"1 The word guardian in this section has been construed to mean guardian ad
lit em. 36 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 416 (1947).
" Wis. STAT. §301.22 (1963).
"a WIs. STAT. §256.48 (1963).
'4 WIs. STAT. §260.22 (1963).
15 Wis. STAT. §324.29 (1963).
16 Wis. STAT. §301.21 (1963).
'7 Wis. STAT. §301.22 (1963).
18 Wis. STAT. §301.23 (1963).
'I Wis. STAT. §260.27 (1963).
20 "Any party, except a minor, may appear by an attorney, agent or in person
and conduct or defend any action. . . ." Wis. STAT. §301.20 (1963).
21 It is probably desirable to relieve a justice of the peace from the burden of
passing on the mental competency or incompetency of a litigant.
22 Although §301.21 makes a next friend responsible for costs and §301.22 re-
lieves a guardian therefrom. This conforms substantially to the practice in
circuit and county courts. Wis. STAT. §260.27 (1963).
23 WIS. STAT. §300.05 (1963).
24 WIs. STAT. §301.245 (1963).
25 However, brief reference will be made to the issue of compensation for next
friends and guardians in the summary of recommendations at the conclusion
of this report.
26 Because of the ever-increasing concurrent jurisdiction between circuit courts
and county courts in Wisconsin, the word court as used herein will refer
to both, and distinction will be made only where necessary.
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they be attorneys; the nature and extent of their responsibility; and
their compensation.
Necessity
Although several statutes provide for the appointment of a guardian
ad liten,2 7 there seems to be no clear-cut basis for the distinction between
those requiring and those permitting appointment. 2s
Appointment is mandatory for a minor or incompetent parent in a
proceeding to terminate parental rights, 29 and for a minor" parent in
order to, make effective that parent's consent to the adoption of his
child 2 1 On the other hand, appointment is discretionary for a hearing
to determine whether a child is delinquent, neglected or dependent,12
and under the interstate compact on juveniles2 It is also permissible
for a minor whose adoption is proposed if the pre-adoption investiga-
tion casts serious doubt on the desirability of the proposed adoption.2 4
Under the Mental Health Act, the court may or may not appoint a
guardian ad litem for the patient in a proceeding to determine the mental
condition of that patient25
In an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, no guardian ad litem need be appointed for a minor obligee peti-
tioner.26
In paternity proceedings, either the district attorney or her private
counsel is automatically appointed guardian ad litem for a minor or
incompetent complainant37 In the latter event, a substitute guardian
ad litem may be appointed if a conflict of interests arises2 8 In other
27 XNis. STAT. §§32.05, .06, .15 (condemnation procedure under right of eminent
domain) (1963), and Wis. STAT. 318.31 (compromise among adverse claimants
to an estate) (1963) provide for the appointment of a special guardian to pro-
tect the interests of minors and incompetents. However, this terminology does
not necessarily require a guardian ad litem since "a special guardian is one who
has special or limited powers and duties with respect to his wards, e.g. a
guardian who has the custody of the estate but not the person, or vice versa,
or a guardian ad lIteL." BLACK, LAW DICrIoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
28Actual appointment need not be pleaded, Wheeler v. Smith, 18 Wis. 682
(1864), nor proved, Hughes v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 126 Wis. 525,
106 N.W. 526 (1906).
29 NVIS. STAT. §48.42 (1963). Whether this adequately protects the child involved
is problematical at best.
30 The requirement does not apply to an incompetent parent.
31 WIs STAT. §48.84 (1963). "[This provision] must be strictly construed and
the concurrence in the consent of the guardian ad litem is a jurisdictional
requirement which cannot be waived by the court. . . . Because of the juris-
dictional defect in failing to obtain the concurrence of a guardian ad litem
in the minor mother's consent to adoption, the judgment decreeing adoption
is void and must be set aside." Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 68, 69a,
49 N.W. 2d 759, 767, 768 (1951).
32 WIS. STAT. §48.25 (1963).
33 WIS. STAT. §48.991 (1963).
34 WIS. STAT. §48.88 (1963).
35 WIS. STAT. §51.02 (1963).
36 Wis. STAT. §52.10 (1963).
37 WIS. STAT. §52.22 (1963).
38 Ibid. No specific provision is made for appointment of a guardian ad litem
for either the child or a minor or incompetent defendant. Cf. Wis. STAT.
1965]
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proceedings in which the paternity of a child born to a married woman
is questioned, the child must be made a party and a guardian ad litem.
must be appointed for the child.39
A guardian ad litein is required to be appointed for an interested
minor or incompetent in actions to foreclose a right of redemption
under a tax deed,40 actions to foreclose a tax lien,41 and in proceedings
under the drainage laws.
42
Those guardians ad litem provisions which relate at least primarily
to probate matters are found in title XXIX of the statutes. 43 When the
court requires an accounting by a fiduciary whom he suspects of fraud,
waste, or mismanagement, he is required to appoint a guardian ad litem
for interested minors or incompetents. 44 Similarly, appointment is re-
quired for both minors and incompetents on a petition by a trustee or
general guardian to sell property.45 In a proceeding to determine descent
of lands, a guardian ad litem must be appointed for an interested minor
for whom no general guardian appears.46 But appointment is evidently
unnecessary in an assignment of a homestead.4'
During a proceeding on a petition to have a general guardian ap-
pointed for an alleged incompetent, "the court may appoint a guardian
ad litem for the ward or proposed ward."4 8 (Emphasis added.) Al-
though the statute seems to render appointment discretionary, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has stated that "we commend the practice of
appointing a guardian ad litein under this section where it is deemed,
by the trial court, to be in the best interests of the ward and we es-
pecially recommend such an appointment where an alleged incompetent
is unable to be present at the guardianship proceedings. '49
Of course, where the value of personal property to which a minor
is entitled does not exceed $1,500, no guardian need be appointed.50
§256.52 (1963), which provides that "in any action or proceeding, except in
paternity proceedings, under ch. 52, the court may appoint a guardian ad
litem for persons not in being or presently unascertainable, if the court has
reason to believe that such appointment is necessary to protect the interests
of such persons." (Emphasis added.)
39 Wis. STAT. §328.39 (1963). This section does not apply to children not yet
born. Limberg v. Limberg, 5 Wis. 2d 327, 92 N.W. 2d, 767 (1958).
40 WIs. STAT. §§75.03, .19 (1963).
41 WIs. STAT. §75.521 (1963). This section also requires appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem for any unknown interested person.4 2 WIS. STAT. §88.10 (1963).
43 WIs. STAT. chs. 310-24 (1963). ("Proceedings in County Courts").
44 WIs. STAT. §312.11 (1963). In a routine accounting, however, the court has
discretion as to appointing a guardian ad litem for interested persons unborn
or presently unascertainable and even for an incompetent. Wis. STAT. §323.10(1963).
45 WIs. STAT. §323.06 (1963).
46 WIS. STAT. §315.04 (1963). The statute does not provide for appointment for
an incompetent.
47 Ws. STAT. §314.05 (1963).
4
8 Wis. STAT. §319.11 (1963).
49 Guardianship of Nelson, 21 Wis. 2d 24, 30, 123 N.W. 2d 505, 509 (1963).
50 Ws. STAT. §319.04(2) (1963). Cf. Wis. STAT. §269.80(3) (1963), about
which more will be said.
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The comprehensive guardian ad litem provision regulating the county
courts is as follows:
Every person under disability shall appear and conduct or de-
fend by his guardian ad litem, who shall be an attorney, or by
the general guardian of his property, who may appear by at-
torney; but a guardian ad litem shall be appointed in all cases
where the minor or incompetent has no general guardian of his
property, or where such general guardian fails to appear on his
behalf, or where the interest of the minor or incompetent is ad-
verse to that of such general guardian....-51
The above action is similar in substance to that in title XXV,52
which applies to "civil actions in the circuit courts and other courts of
record, having concurrent jurisdiction therewith to a greater or less
extent, in civil actions, and to special proceedings in such courts except
where its provisions are clearly inapplicable or inappropriate to special
proceedings." 53 Section 260.22 provides that
when a party to an action or proceeding is a minor, or when the
court or judge has reason to believe that a party is mentally in-
competent to have charge of his affairs, he must appear either by
the general guardian of his property or by a guardian ad litem
who is an attorney appointed by the court or by a judge thereof.
A guardian ad litem shall be appointed in all cases where the
minor or incompetent has no general guardian of his property,
or where such general guardian fails to appear on his behalf, or
where the interest of the minor or incompetent is adverse to that
of such general guardian.
The difficulty in reconciling these sections lies not in the latter parts
of each, which are identical, 54 but in the preceding portions which could
be differently construed. While both provide in the alternative for ap-
pearance by "the general guardian of his property" or by the guardian
ad litem, the county court statute requires such appearance on behalf of
"every person under disability" (without defining disability), but the
requirement under section 260.22 is aimed at a "minor, or [a party who]
the court or judge has reason to believe ... is mentally incompetent to
have charge of his affairs." Granting that both refer to minors and
mental incompetents, do the tests differ with respect to alleged incom-
petents? Is one objective and the other subjective? In order to receive
the protection of a guardian ad litem under section 324.29, is it neces-
sary that the proposed ward be a judicially-declared incompetent? Or
may he be one who the judge thinks is mentally incompetent to have
52 Wis. STAT. §324.29(1) (1963).
52 WIS. STAT. chs. 260-81 (1963) ("Procedure in Civil Actions").53 WIs. STAT. §260.01 (1963).
54 Both sections were amended to include this provision by Wis. Laws 1953, ch.
298, §§1, 2.
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charge of his affairs ?55 If the tests be, in fact, different-and there
seems no justification for a difference, since inherent necessity for pro-
tection would not depend upon the jurisdiction of the court-then the
function of a county court judge would be little more than ministerial,
while a circuit court judge would be called upon to make at least a
finding of fact (and hence be somewhat more susceptible to reversal).
On the other hand, if the tests be the same, it would seem that the lan-
guage of the statutes should coincide.56
Controversial section 269.80 provides (in part) that:
(1) A compromise or settlement of an action or proceeding to
which a minor or mentally incompetent person is a party
may be made by his guardian ad litem with the approval of
the court in which such action or proceeding is pending.
(2) A cause of action in favor of or against a minor or mentally
incompetent person may, with the approval of any court of
record, be settled by a guardian ad litem without the com-
mencement of an action thereon; and for such purpose, the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem....
The first subsection is a composite of sections 260.23(4) (as to
minors) and 260.24(2) (as to incompetent persons), which originated
as rules of the supreme court.5 7 They were proposed by the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Pleading, Practice, and Procedure (the pre-
cursor to the Judicial Council), whose report of June 12, 1941, to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "proposed [section 260.23(4)]
furnishes a definite rule for the settlement of the rights of minors who
are parties to an action. As present the practice is varied and the powers
of the guardian ad litem to compromise or settle a claim are uncertain.
A rule on the subject is needed .... What has been said relating to the
proposed rule for minors ...applies equally to the rule for ... in-
competents." '58
These two original sections were consolidated and renumbered to
55 There is some authority for this position. At the time of service of summons
upon him, the defendant was insane, but had not been so adjudged. After
default judgment had been taken against him, the court appointed a guardian
ad litem, who moved to set aside the judgment. The trial court obliged, and
the supreme court affirmed, pointing out that the lower court had both the
power and the duty to appoint a guardian ad litem when it appeared that the
defendant was insane. "The proposition that mere formal service of process
upon a person insane in fact, although not judicially declared to be insane,
will enable the plaintiff to take a judgment by default which cannot be opened
to let in a meritorious defense, cannot be entertained for a moment." Gerster
v. Hilbert, 38 Wis. 609, 613 (1875).
56 Both sections require a representative for even an incompetent plaintiff. This
is a change from the common law, which permitted a lunatic to maintain his
own suit, but denied that right to a minor. Menz v. Beebe, 95 Wis. 383, 70
N.W. 468 (1897); Weisman v. Donald 125 Wis. 600, 104 N.W. 915 (1905).
57 They were promulgated in 239 Wis. v (1942).
5s Section 260.24(2) authorized compromise or settlement by either a general
guardian or by a guardian ad litern.
(Vol. 48
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section 260.23(4) in 1949."9 The wording of section 260.23(4) was
identical to that of the present day section 269.80(1). In fact, the pre-
amble to the amending act60 stated that its purpose was "to consolidate,
revise and renumber ... 260.23, 260.24(2) and (3) and 260.25 to be
260.23."61 There was no acknowledged intent to create, but the new
section 260.23 (5) authorized settlements without action, in the language
of today's section 269.80(2),62 even though none of the old sections
mentioned in the preamble had dealt therewith. Thus, the authors have
the decidedly uneasy impression that somehow, somewhere along the
way, someone pulled wool over the eyes of the venerable legislature.63
Probably no great harm has been done, however, since the supreme
court has enunciated an even stronger rule, with but passing reference
to section 269.80(2). Andresen v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co.,6 4 a fairly
recent case involving settlement of a minor's personal injury claim,
gives a clear picture of the court's attitude toward the necessity of a
guardian ad litem. The young plaintiff had been injured by the de-
fendant's insured. The boys' father signed and filed, in the county court,
a petition for an order approving a settlement of $600. There was a
hearing, at which the child was represnted by an attorney, and the
court signed the order of approval. No guardian ad litem had been
appointed, and three years later the settlement was vacated on that
ground, on the petition of a newly-appointed guardian ad litem. The
trial court at the second hearing interpreted section 269.80(2) "to mean
that the right-to settle such a cause of action, with the approval of the
Court, is limited exclusively to a guardian ad litem, and that it was not
intended to permit the settlement to be made, even with the permission
of the Court, by a friend or even by a parent of the minor. ... ,65 But
the trial court relied far more heavily on sections 260.23(2) and
324.29.6;
In affirming, Justice Gordon looked almost exclusively to section
260.22. "We are asked to treat the appointment of a guardian ad litem
as a mere technicality on the theory that the child was fully and ade-
quately represented. It is a complete answer to this contention to note
that [section] 260.22 . . . provides that the minor 'must appear either
59 Wis. Laws 1949, ch. 301. This act deleted the authority of the general guardian.
See note 58 supra.
60 Wis. Laws of 1949, ch. 301.
61 Ibid.
62 This subsequent renumbering was accomplished by Wis. Laws 1955, ch. 210.
63 Correspondence with several people who were members of the pertinent com-
mittee at that time shed no light on the mystery. However, in view of the
ease with which an action may be commenced, so as to make §269.80(1)
operative, the issue is probably of little or no practical importance.
64 17 Wis. 2d 380, 117 N.W. 2d 360 (1962).
65 Brief for Defendant, p. 106 (appendix).
66 Id. at 107-09.
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by the general guardian of his property or by a guardian ad litem who
is an attorney appointed by the court or by a judge thereof.' ,67
The defendant had argued that sections 319.04(2) and 269.80(3),
authorizing payment of sums less than $1,000 directly to a minor, ap-
plied and abrogated the necessity of appointment of a guardian ad litem.
To this contention, justice Gordon replied: "[B]ut in neither section
is there any suggestion that the minor's claim may be compromised with-
out compliance with [section] 260.22 regarding the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, if there be no general guardian. [Section] 319.04(2)
and [section] 269.80(3) provide for the distribution of the minor's
assets without the appointment of a general guardian where the amount
involved is small. However, it cannot be said that such actions sanction
judicial approval of the settlement of a minor's claims without the
formality of having a guardian ad litem. Indeed, [section] 269.80(2)
expressly provides for the appointment of a guardian ad [item."' 68 Thus
has the permissive language of section 269.80(2) apparently been made
mandatory.
Usually, appointment of a guardian ad litem is considered a pro-
cedural matter.69 "As a general rule, the appointment of a guardian
ad litem for an infant defendant is held to be a matter of procedure
and not one of jurisdiction. Being a matter of procedure, the failure of
the court to conform to proper procedure may make the judgment er-
roneous but it is not void. In this respect the failure to appoint a guar-
dian ad litem is analogous to failure of an infant plaintiff to be repre-
sented by a next friend."70
Thus, lack of a guardian ad litem makes a judgment voidable, and
subject only to direct attack.7'1 As to other parties, the proceedings may
be binding.7 2
Where an adverse party has objected for the first time on appeal
to failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a victorious minor plaintiff,
the court has dismissed the objection as one not going to the merits of
the action or defense, 3 or has held it waived if not taken by demurrer
or answer.7 4 The court in one such case termed the failure "at most,
67Andresen v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 380, 383, 117 N.W. 2d
360,361 (1962).
68 Id. at 383-84, 117 N.W. 2d at 362.
69 Contra, Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W. 2d 759 (1951).
70 Estate of Thompson, 212 Wis. 172, 178, 248 N.W. 167, 169 (1933).
71 "True, a judgment rendered against a minor where he is not represented by
a guardian ad litern, is not void. Such representation is not jurisdictional.
Notwithstanding abuse of it, the judgment is proof against collateral attack.
It can only be avoided by appeal for error, where the minority appears of
record, or otherwise by motion or other direct proceeding in the action sea-
sonably resorted to." Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556,
563, 126 N.W. 50, 52 (1910).
72 Jenks v. Allen, 151 Wis. 625, 139 N.W. 433 (1913).
73Hafern v. Davis, 10 Wis. 501 (1860); Redlin v. Wagner, 160 Wis. 447, 152
N.W. 160 (1915).
, Fey v. I.O.O.F. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 Wis. 358, 98 N.W. 206 (1904).
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a technical irregularity which could not affect any substantial right of
the defendant."7
5
On the other hand, an unrepresented minor may avoid a judgment
against him by making a timely motion to open the judgment.7 6 But
when the unrepresented minor waited for twenty-six years after reach-
ing majority and then attempted to open a final judgment construing
a will, the court found him guilty of laches. 7
Failure to appoint may result in failure to comply with notice re-
quirements. Twice, in nearly irreconcilable cases, lower courts appointed
an administrator de bonia non where there was no guardian ad litem
for minor heirs. In one,7 8 it was reversible error; in the other7 9 it
was valid.
In a dispute between an executor-trustee and the sureties on his
bonds, a guardian ad litem was appointed for incompetent heirs but not
for minor residuary legatees.80 This failure constituted a reversible
error.
81
However, where a minor's interest is so remote that he is not a
necessary party to the action, evidently no guardian ad litem is neces-
sary for him.82 But in such a situation, an aggrieved party (other than
a general guardian) may not take an appeal on behalf of the minor.8 3
For lack of statutory requirement, no guardian ad litem is apparently
necessary in proceedings before the Industrial Commission. 4 Nor need
one be appointed for unknown minor and incompetent heirs in a pro-
bate proceeding if the court is told by the proponents of the will that
the decedent has no heirs,85 or if all heirs and devisees are known and
are sui juris.86
75 Hepp v. Huefner, 61 Wis. 148, 151, 20 N.W. 923, 924 (1884).
76 Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N.W. 50 (1910).
7 In re Brandstedter's Estate, 198 Wis. 457, 224 N.W. 735 (1929).7 8 Hubbard v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 104 Wis. 160, 80 N.W. 454 (1899).
79 Jenks v. Allen, 151 Wis. 625, 139 N.W. 433 (1913). The court seemed to feel
that in Hubbard v. Chicago & N.W. supra note 78, cognizance had not been
taken of the correct notice statute.
80 Estate of Thompson, 212 Wis. 172, 248 N.W. 167 (1933).
81 "[I]t was called to the attention of the trial court that the residency legatees
were not represented. The court should thereupon have appointed a guardian
ad litem for such residuary legatees, and the failure to do so makes the
judgment erroneous for the reason that the executor and his sureties should
not be bound and required to pay when it appears from the record that other
parties have an interest in the controversy who are not concluded by the same
judgment." Id. at 178-79, 248 N.W. at 169.
82 In re Austin's Estate,258 Wis. 578, 46 N.W. 2d 861 (1951) (petition to have
alimony and support money paid from a testamentary trust) ; In re Estate of
Koch, 148 Wis. 548, 134 N.W. 663 (1912) (claim against an estate in which
there were minor heirs); McKinney v. Jones, 55 Wis. 39, 11 N.W. 606 (1882)
(action on express contract made by general guardian for benefit of wards).8 3 In re Guardianship of McLaughlin, 101 Wis. 672, 78 N.W. 144 (1899).
84 Bellrichard v. Industrial Commn, 248 Wis. 231, 21 N.W. 2d 395 (1945);
Menominee Bay Lumber Co. v. Industrial Conm'n, 162 Wis. 344, 156 N.W.
151 (1916).
85 In re Knoepfle's Will, 243 Wis. 572, 11 N.W. 2d 127 (1943).
86 Estate of Strange, 7 Wis. 2d 404, 97 N.W. 2d 99 (1959).
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Nor is a guardian ad litern a sine qua non in federal courts. Rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative,
such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like
fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent per-
son does not have a duly appointed representative he may sue by
his next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint
a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not
otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order
as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent
person. 7
The foregoing rule is interpreted to mean that the court may dispense
with the appointment of a guardian ad litem only after having made a
judicial determination that the infant or incompetent person is ade-
quately protected. 8 The underlying philosophy of the rule seems to
contrast with that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court as set forth in
Matter of Andresen.89 Rule 17(c) has been succinctly explained as
follows:
Rule 17(c) does not make the appointment of a guardian ad litem
mandatory. If the court feels that the infant's interests are other-
wise adequately represented and protected, a guardian ad litem
need not be appointed. . . . But the rule does not mean that a
judge may ignore or overlook such a fundamental requirement
for the protection of infants. We spell out the rule to mean:
(1) as a matter of proper procedure, the court should usually
appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) but the court may, after weigh-
ing all the circumstances, issue such order as will protect the
minor in lieu of appointment of a guardian; (3) and may even
decide that such appointment is unnecessary, though only after
the court has considered the matter and made a judicial determi-
nation that the infant is protected without a guardian ad
litem....
The record in this case shows that no one gave a thought to
the appointment of a guardian ad litem until after judgment was
rendered below. Apparently, it was an oversight. We believe that
the discretion lodged in the trial judge in Rule 17(c) was not
intended to apply to such a situation. The orderly administration
of justice and the procedural protection of minors requires the.
trial judge to give due consideration to the propriety of an in-
ST 28 U.S.C. (1958).
88 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F. 2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
89 17 Wis. 2d 380, 383, 117 N.W. 2d 360, 361 (1962). "The legislature has wisely
directed that a guardian ad litem be appointed for a minor who does not have
a general guardian. This is a desirable way of assuring that in every case the
infant's rights will be fully protected. This is true even though there is an
attorney who has been chosen by the parents to assist in the processing of
the child's claim. While in the great bulk of cases the child's interests and the
parents' interests fully coincide, there will be some cases where the infant's
rights can better be protected by an officer whose interests do not extend
beyond the child and the court."
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fant's representation by a guardian ad litem before he may dis-
pense with the necessity of appointing the guardian. 90
The conclusion is almost inescapable that if the above guide-lines
are followed, a minor or incompetent person would be as well pro-
tected, with far less expense, as under a system in which appointment
is mandatory. True, the burden on the court may be somewhat heavier
in certain situations, but after all, "when an infant appears as a party
to an action pending before a court, he becomes a ward of the court,
and it is the duty of the court to see that the interest of its ward is
protected."91 "The guardian ad litem is appointed merely to aid and
enable the court to perform that duty of protection. '92
Attorney as Guardian Ad Litem
The general requirement that a guardian ad litem be an attorney
is found in section 256.48 of the Wisconsin statutes:
In all matters in which a guardian ad litem is appointed by the
court, the guardian ad litem shall be an attorney admitted to
practice in this state .... 93
Although this section would seem to be all-inclusive, there are a
few other specific statutory references to the requirement.
Under the Children's Code, "[the guardian ad litem] shall be an
attorney admitted to practice in this state."94 In the county courts, he
"shall be an attorney," 95 while in the circuit courts he "is an attorney.""9
The old provisions that a guardian ad litem be a "reputable attor-
ney" 97 were repealed by chapter 572 of the Laws of 1963. The authors
will not comment on the possibility of any inference to be drawn there-
from!
Since either private counsel or the district attorney is automatically
appointed guardian ad litem for the complainant in a paternity pro-
ceeding, he would ex officio be an attorney.9s If a conflict of interest
arises, "the court may then appoint another qualified person to act as
guardian ad litem." 99 (Emphasis added). Presumably, this "qualified
person" would have to be an attorney, under the provision of section
256.48.
Since it is the duty of a guardian ad litern to protect the legal interest
90 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F. 2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958).
91Will of Jaeger, 218 Wis. 1, 10, 259 N.W. 842, 846 (1935), 99 A.L.R. 738, 745.
92 Richardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 578, 86 N.W. 250, 251 (1910).
93 Chapter 256 is a part of title XXIV ("Courts of Record"), and so applies
alike to circuit and county courts.
94 WIs. STAT. §48.02 (1963).95 WIS. STAT. §324.29(1) (1963).
9r Wis. STAT. §260.22 (1963).
97 Wis. STAT. §§88.22, 89.05 (1961).
98 WIs. STAT. §52.22 (1963).
99 Ibid.
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of his ward throughout a given judicial proceeding, 00 the requirement
is probably wise. To the extent, then, that a guardian ad litem is neces-
sary, he should probably be an attorney.
Nature and Extent of Responsibility
To say that the rights of a guardian ad litem are not statutory is as
much an understatement as: "The duties of a guardian ad litem are
not prescribed by statute."''1 1
In fact, the language of the controlling statutes in the area leads one
to wonder whether the legislature contemplated a responsibility in the
county court differing from that in the circuit court. Section 324.29,
which controls county courts, provides that "every person under dis-
ability shall appear and conduct or defend by his guardian ad litem. '102
(Emphasis added.) On the other hand, section 260.22, which applies
to circuit courts, provides that a person under disability "must appear
either by the general guardian of his property or by a guardian ad
litem." (Emphasis added.)
If this distinction were carried to its illogical conclusion, it might
mean that in a circuit court a guardian ad litem could simply appear
with hands folded over his closed briefcase, and then collect his fee
and slip quietly away; while in a nearby county court-room, a guardian
ad litem was controlling the litigation.
It is as difficult to believe that the difference is intended,10 3 as it is
to find a justification for any difference. Again, it would seem that
neither the inherent need for protection, nor the type of protection
100 Authorities cited notes 9 and 10 supra.
101 Will of Jaeger, 218 Wis. 1, 10, 259 N.W. 842, 846 (1935), 99 A.L.R. 738, 745.
102 Cf. WIs. STAT. §328.39(1) (a) (1963), which provides that "the court . . .
shall appoint a guardian ad litem to appear for and represent the child whose
paternity is questioned." (Emphasis added.)
103 Section 324.29 was created by the Wis. Laws 1887, ch. 295, which provided
that "every person under disability shall appear and conduct or defend by
his guardian ad liten," language which has survived to the present time.
Section 260.22, on the other hand, is a consolidation of two separate lines of
statutes. The provisions relating to minors consistently required appearance
by a guardian, Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §16 (1858), Wis. REv. STAT. §2613(1878), Wis. REv. STAT. §2613 (1898), or by a guardian ad litem, Wis. STAT.
§26022 (1963), as amended by order of the supreme court, 212 Wis. vii
(1933), and Wis. Laws 1949, ch. 301. However, the provisions relating to
mental incompetents originally required an action to be prosecuted or de-fended by a guardian, Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 96, §14 (1849), Wis. REv. STAT.
ch. 122, §10 (1858), Wis. REv. STAT. §2615 (1878), Wis. RIv. STAT. §2615(1898), Wis. STAT. §260.24 (1925). As revised by supreme court order,
212 Wis. vii (1933), a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent a mental
incompetent. The statutes relating to minors and mental incompetents were
consolidated by Wis. Laws 1949, ch. 301, and renumbered to §260.22, which
was still worded in terms of appearance on behalf of a minor and representa-
tion on behalf of a mental incompetent. It was under Wis. Laws 1953, ch.
298, that the current language emerged to require appearance for both. Per-
haps the legislature merely intended to bring the rule pertaining to mental
incompetents in line with that covering minors, and simply overlooked the
discrepancy between §§260.22 and 324.29.
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needed, would or should depend upon the jurisdiction the court-es-
pecially since so much jurisdiction is now concurrent. 0 4
Although, as will be pointed out, there are a few specific statutory
regulations, and some rules to be gleaned from pronouncements of the
court, the guidelines were established long ago in the Tyson cases.10
In Justice Marshall's words:
The appointment of [a guardian ad litern] is for all purposes of
the action. It is necessary on account of the disability of the minor
defendants. For that reason it continues till such disability ceases,
unless the guardian is sooner discharged by the court. While
such guardian is at all times under the control of the court, the
responsibility of protecting the infant's interest wholly devolves
upon him, and he is answerable in damages for negligence in that
regard. It is his duty to examine into the case, and to use all the
usual methods for the protection of the interests of the minor
which the exercise of reasonable care and prudence would dic-
tate .... The mere perfunctory performance of duty does not
meet the requirements of the position. It is the duty of the
guardian to use all reasonable means to thoroughly master the
minor's case, and to make a vigorous defense, if in his judgment
the circumstances are such as to demand it for the protection of
104 Wis. STAT. §253.11 (1963).
'105 This was a series of cases arising from an inter vivos trust, under which
the grantor reserved a life estate in himself, with a gift over to his daughter
and the remainder to her children, then unborn. The lower court held that
the trust deed was invalid and that all the property passed to the daughter,
who brought a quiet title action in which a guardian ad litern was appointed
for the children which she had by that time. The trial court quieted title in
the daughter, and the guardian ad litem filed his notice of appeal. The statu-
tory time ran out, however, before he could find someone to put up the bond
for the undertaking, and he was finally forced to move, in the supreme
court, for permission to file the undertaking. Opposing counsel moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the guardian ad litern had exceeded
his authority. The supreme court granted permission, saying that "if the
guardian ad litem deemed the interest of the minor defendants prejudiced by
the judgment rendered against them, especially when supported in that view
by the advice of eminent counsel called to his assistance, it was not only his
right, but it was his duty, to proceed in the only way open to him for a
review of such judgment." Tyson v. Tyson, 94 Wis. 225, 231, 68 N.W. 1015,
1017 (1896)..Then came the appeal on the merits, with the guardian ad litem
again emerging victorious, as the supreme court held that his wards had
a valid contingent remainder. Tyson v. Tyson, 96 Wis. 59, 71 N.W. 94 (1897).
Next the guardian ad litem was forced to appeal from an order disallowing
a lien on the remainder estate for his services. Again the lower court was
reversed. Tyson v. Richardson, 103 Wis. 397, 79 N.W. 439 (1899). The next,
and last, time that the case went up, the issue was the amount of the guardian
ad litem'rs fee, which the supreme court reduced from $5,000 to $2,500! There
was, perhaps, some consolation in the court's stating: "The performance
of his important functions has already won for [the guardian ad litem]
commendation from this court, and it is at the express wish of all its mem-
bers that the writer of this opinion reasserts approval of the loyalty to the
wards' interests, the -fearlessness and courage against severe opposition and
at the sacrifice of personal comfort, and the distinguished industry and
professional learning and ability which have characterized Mr. Richardson's
performance of those official duties resulting from his appointment as guard-
ian ad litem ... " Richardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 578, 86 N.W. 250,
251-52 (1901).
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the interests of such minor. To that end, the guardian appointed
in the lower court continues throughout all stages of the case
unless discharged.... The idea advanced by the respondent that
the general powers of the guardian are limited to defending in
the court where appointed; that he cannot take an appeal from
a judgment against the minor without permission, is contrary to the
nature of the office and to the uniform practice .... He may,
and often prudence requires that he should, take the advice of the
court, and act under its direction in proceedings to maintain the
rights of the minor; but he may proceed without such advice
or direction if he sees fit. But, whether he proceeds or fails to
proceed, unless the direction of the court, he does so at his peril
of being held responsible for a reasonably prudent and intelli-
gent performance of duty. In the performance of such duty he
may interpose a defense, affirmative or otherwise, set up a coun-
terclaim, or may appeal from an adverse judgment, as in his
judgment the exigencies of the situation may require, in order
fully to maintain the rights of the minor.10 6
[The guardian ad litem is] required to be an officer of the court
fully competent to understand and protect the rights of the de-
fendants, and in no way connected in business with the attorneys
for the adverse party, and of sufficient financial ability to com-
pensate the infants for any loss that might be sustained by them
through his neglect or misconduct in attending to their defense.
. . . It was the further duty of the person appointed, being an
officer of the court, to accept the trust reposed in him and to
seasonably investigate the questions of law and fact involved in
the litigation, and to the best of his ability discover the rights of
[his wards], to take nothing for granted in [the adverse party's]
favor that by any reasonable probability could be the subject of
contest, to make no admissions regarding such matters adverse
to [his ward's], but to put the [adverse party] to proof of the
facts as to every such matter upon which relief in her behalf was
demanded, to make a vigorous defense against [the adverse
party's] claim where defense was reasonable in any view of the
case, to bring all the facts and the law . . . to the attention of
the court, not stopping even with an adverse decision if reason-
able doubt as to its justice existed .... 107
Little can be added to the above, which is admittedly dicta, without
seeming superfluous. But for the sake of completeness, the relevant
statutes and cases will be examined.
That a guardian ad litem is cast in the role of an advocate, as so
admirably appears in the Tyson cases, is supported by other authori-
ties.10 In Will of Jaeger,0 9 the testator had directed that the residue
of his estate was to be placed in trust for veterans and that the trust
be administered by a civic committee, naming contingent beneficiaries
'Or Tyson v. Tyson, 94 Wis. 225, 229-30, 68 N.W. 1015, 1016 (1896).
107 Tyson v. Richardson, 103 Wis. 397, 399-400, 79 N.W. 439, 440 (1899).
108 Parsons v. Balson, 129 Wis. 311, 109 N.W. 136 (1906); Marx v. Rowlands,
59 Wis. 110, 17 N.W. 687 (1883).109 218 Wis. 1, 259 N.W. 842 (1935), 99 A.L.R. 738.
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if the trust failed within ten years. No civic committee was ever formed
and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor contingent bene-
ficiaries when the trustee's final account came on for hearing. The
guardian ad litern was of the opinion that the trust was still valid and
that his wards, therefore, had no interest in the residue. He so re-
ported to the lower court, and reiterated his position in his brief in
the supreme court on appeal by an adult contingent beneficiary from a
decree continuing the trust in existence. The supreme court, on its own
motion, struck his brief, on the theory that the minors were unrepre-
sented, and appointed another guardian ad litem. The court conceded
that "where the duty of an attorney to his client conflicts with his duty
to the court, the duty to the court is the higher duty, and the perform-
ance of that duty excuses the performance of the duty which is owing
to the client.... No attorney is required by his duty as guardian ad litern
or as counsel to stultify himself. . . . Of course, there may be cases
where the facts and the law are such as to admit of no controversy as
to the rights of parties. Certainly this is not one of those cases."'110 The
correct procedure under the circumstances would have been for the
guardian ad litem to resign and for another to be appointed in his stead.
On the other hand, where all beneficiaries under a testamentary trust
were parties to an agreement which completely changed the dispositive
plan, the guardians ad litem had the duty to protect their wards' "inter-
est in the testamentary scheme if it was valid, not endeavor to obtain
the same or greater interest by destroying it .... It was [their] duty
to vindicate the will, if it was valid, rather than to enter into any scheme
to supersede it.""'
The duty to act as an advocate emphasizes the fact that a guardian
-ad litem is not a party to the action.1 1 2 As has been noted," 3 a guardian
ad litem for a plaintiff (but not for a defendant) is required to consent
in writing to his appointment. 1 4 . The distinction may be based upon
110 Id. at 11-12, 259 N.W. at 846, 99 A.L.R. at 745-46.
' Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 473, 474, 136 N.W. 956, 984 (1912). In this case
the court said of one guardian ad litem that he would have fulfilled his duty
had he "merely entered appearance whenever necessary in the proceedings
to enable the court to make a binding and orderly termination, stimulated
the executors and their attorneys to do their duty, and occupied an advisory
or adversary attitude toward them as occasion required, and otherwise re-
mained passive in the administration proceedings, unless there was some
reasonable necessity to do otherwise... ." Id. at 475, 136 N.W. at 984. This
is, of course, not necessarily contradictory, and must be read in the light
that the court was reprimanding the guardians ad litem for having exceeded
their authority.
112 Steel v. Ritter, 16 Wis. 2d 281, 114 N.W. 2d 436 (1962) ; Scheiderer v. George
Schulz Co., 169 Wis. 6, 171 N.W. 660 (1919); Burbach v. Milwaukee Elec.
Ry. & Light Co., 119 Wis. 384, 96 N.W. 829 (1903).
113 See note 19 supra.
114 "No person slall be appointed but upon his written consent as guardian for
a plaintiff; and no guardian of a defendant shall be liable personally for
costs unless by special order of the court for some misconduct therein."
Wis. STAT. §260.27 (1963). This provision was created by Wis. REv. STAT. §2618
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the fact that at one time a guardian for a plaintiff was personally liable
for the costs of an action." 5 The language of section 260.27 which
hints that a plaintiff's guardian ad litem could be personally liable for
costs while exonerating a defendant's guardian ad litem therefrom is
probably overshadowed by section 271.14 which provides that
in any action or proceeding prosecuted or defended in any court
in Wisconsin by. .. [a] guardian ad litem . . ., unless otherwise
specially provided, costs shall be recovered as in an action by
and against a person prosecuting or defending in his own right;
but such costs shall be chargeable only upon or collected of the
estate, fund or party represented, unless the court shall direct
the same, to paid by the plaintiff or defendant[116] personally,
for mismanagement or bad faith in such action, proceeding or
defense....
Thus it would appear that under normal circumstances no guardian
ad litem should be personally liable for costs.
Theoretically, of course, a guardian ad litem is subject to the re-
quirement that he post a bond."1 7 Since, however, the requirement is
predicated upon receipt of money or property belonging to the ward,
it is difficult to imagine under what circumstances the statute would
become operative. 18 For the same reason, the possibility that a guardian
ad litem would be required to make an accounting" 9 seems remote.
A guardian ad litem may not waive personal service of a summons
on his ward in the circuit courts,"20 nor notice of a petition to prove a
will or for administration in the county courts. 21 Thus, although in
neither court may initial process be waived, waiver of notice of subse-
quent proceedings in the county court is permitted.122
(1878), and the revisor's note thereto indicates that it was intended "to de-
fine an established and necessary practice as to guardians for plaintiff, and
to declare the law as to guardians for defendants. By rule, any attorney is
bound to act as a guardian for a defendant on direction of the court."
15 Huebl v. Scollard, 142 Wis. 589, 126 N.W. 12 (1910), and Burbach v. Mil-
waukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 119 Wis. 384, 96 N.W. 829 (1903), based
upon Wis. REv. STAT. §2931 (1898), which specifically made a plaintiff's
guardian responsible for costs.
116 The phrase plaintiff or defendant refers to the fiduciary. Roberts v. Lamber-
ton, 117 Wis. 635, 94 N.W. 650 (1903) ; Beem v. Kimberly, 72 Wis. 343, 39
N.W. 542 (1888); Ladd v. Anderson, 58 Wis. 591, 17 N.W. 320 (1883).
"17 "No guardian appointed under the provisions of this chapter shall be per-
mitted to receive any money or property of the ward, except costs and
expenses allowed to the guardian or recovered for his ward, until he has
executed to the ward and filed with the clerk a bond . . .; except he be
also the general guardian of such ward .... " Wis. STAT. §260.27 (1963).
118However, "on appeals from county courts to the supreme court, no bond
shall be required or costs awarded against any child or person acting in
behalf of the child on an appeal from an order of adoption; and no bond
shall be required of any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or alleged
insane or incompetent person." Wis. STAT. §324.04(2) (1963). The second
clause would, presumably, include guardian ad litem.
119 Wis. STAT. §§324.35, .351, .356 (1963).
120 WIS. STAT. §262.16 (1963).
121 WIS. STAT. §324.18(2) (1963).
122 Ibid; cf. In re West's Estate, 231 Wis. 377, 284 N.W. 565 (1939).
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The guardian ad litem has the duty to investigate all questions of
law and fact involved in the litigation in order to ascertain the rights
of his ward. 23 In adoption proceedings, he is required to join in the
consent of a minor mother.12  However, the mother must sign her
consent before the adoptive parents may present their petition; and
the guardian ad litem is not appointed until the petition for adoption
is filed.? "This would indicate that the function of the guardian ad litem
in adoption cases is not to counsel with the mother at the time of
signing her consent, but rather that he is to make his own independent
investigation thereafter as to whether the mother freely and voluntarily
executed such consent, and also whether the best intersts of the child
would be promoted by his joining in such consent. It would seem that
such action by the guardian ad litem. . . should take place promptly
after [his] appointment ... "226
There is some authority to the effect that a guardian ad litern need
not be served with copies of any of the pleadings. 2 7 However, in the
interest of caution and courtesy, the better practice would probably be
to serve him.
The issue of the right of the guardian ad litem to retain counsel to
represent his wards or himself is raised in cases in which he has in
fact done so and is seeking to recover the attorney's fee as part of his
costs. For the guiding principle in this respect, we turn once again to
a Tyson case:
The policy in this state ... is that attorneys be appointed to such
position on the assumption that the guardian himself will be un-
able to render the professional services necessary to any ordinary
situation. Hence the employment of additional counsel can only
be justified by unusual or extraordinary circumstances. If the
guardian takes such step without an order of the court, he as-
sumes the peril that it may be disproved, and he be left to bear
the expense personally. Nevertheless, if, after the fact, it appears
that such precaution was reasonably necessary for the welfare of
the minors, and such as the court would have authorized in
advance had application been made, no reason is apparent why
the reasonable expense should not be allowed .... [I]t still re-
mains in such case a question for the court whether the extra-
ordinary circumstances do exist to make necessary or proper
such employment, and whether the services rendered by the
attorney are merely those which the guardian might himself have
rendered, or are such as, owing to the situation, he could not
properly perform. There is no absolute limit on the power of
123 Parsons v. Balson, 129 Wis. 311, 109 N.W. 136 (1906) ; Tyson v. Richardson,
103 Wis. 397, 79 N.W. 439 (1899).
124 WIS. STAT. §48.84 (1963).
125 Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W. 2d 759 (1951).
126 Id. at 67-68, 49 N.W. 2d at 767-68.
127 Jolitz v. Graff, 12 Wis. 2d 52, 106 N.W. 2d 340 (1960).
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the court to allow such disbursement; merely considerations re-
strictive of the exercise of its judgment and discretion.',
Thus, attorney's fees were allowed for consultations, since the
guardian ad litem was relatively inexperienced and wanted confirma-
tion of his opinion that his wards had a valid remainder interest,- 9 and
for services at the hearing on the guardian ad litem's petition for costs
and fee. 130 Similarly, an attorney was allowed compensation from the
estate when he was retained by the guardian ad litemr to represent the
ward at an out-of-state construction of the will."'1 But services rendered
by the attorney merely as an accommodation while the guardian ad litem
was out of the state were considered as only a part of the total services
rendered by the guardian ad litem."2
The authority of a guardian ad litem to compromise a claim or con-
troversy on behalf of his ward is subject to the approval of the court.133
Neither guardians ad litemr nor anyone else may execute an agreement
which completely changes a testamentary plan of disposition.1
4
Under the Children's Code,1 5 a guardian ad litem must join in his
ward's consent to termination of the ward's parental rights,1 36 to adop-
tion of the ward's child,"37 and to the ward's consent to return to the
demanding state under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles.1 38 Simi-
larly, a trustee or general guardian may not purchase any property from
the trust without the written consent of all parties and of the guardian
ad litem for any interested minors or incompetents."
The extent of the guardian ad litem's participation in the proceedings
lies somewhere between his role as a party who is not a party140 and
the fact that he has no right to control the litigation.14 1 It has been said
12SRichardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 583, 586, 86 N.W. 250, 253-54 (1901). See
also Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956 (1912).
129 Richardson v. Tyson, supra note 128.
130 "At that hearing the entire conduct of [the guardian ad litem] was on trial;
the facts as to the detail and volume of the services rendered by him, their
quality, and the embarrassments and opposition under which they were per-
formed, all were to be investigated, and in large measure must call for
extended examination and cross-examination of himself as a witness. All this
would have rendered his conduct of the hearing as his own advocate highly
embarrassing, if not unseemly ... " Richardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 588,
86 N.W. 250, 255 (1901).
"'1 Ford v. Ford, 88 Wis. 122, 59 N.W. 464 (1894).
132 Richardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 86 N.W. 250, (1901).
13 Wis. STAT. §§269.80, 318.31 (1963). Section 318.31 gives such authority to "a
special guardian appointed by the court." As has been noted, this may include
a guardian ad litern. See note 27 supra.
134 Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956 (1912).
135 The Children's Code, incidentally, specifies that thereunder a guardian ad
litem "has none of the rights of a general guardian." Wis. STAT. §48.02(8).
136 Wis. STAT. §48.42 (1963).
137 WIS. STAT. §48.84 (1963). Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W. 2d
759 (1951).
138 Wis. STAT. §48.991 (1963).
139 WIS. STAT. §323.06 (1963).
140 See note 112 supra.
'41 In re Estate of Patterson, 193 Wis. 392, 214 N.W. 344 (1927).
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that "in the performance of [his] duty he may interpose a defense,
affirmative or otherwise, [or] set up a counterclaim.., as in his judg-
ment the exigencies of the situation may require, in order to fully
maintain the rights of the minor."'142 However, the only statutory pro-
vision for the subpoenaing of witnesses and presentment of proof by
a guardian ad litern relates to a hearing following an unfavorable report
of a pre-adoption investigation. 143 Presumably, his duty to do all things
necessary to protect the rights of his ward encompasses a right to par-
ticipate in the conduct of litigation.1 44 In essence, the problem seems to
be little more than the practical matter of communication and co-opera-
tion with attorneys representing parties who have interests identical
or similar to the ward's. 145 Where there are no such parties, his role
as an adversary should be beyond dispute.
When his duties in the court of original jurisdiction have been per-
formed, a guardian ad litem has the unquestionable right (if not duty)
to appeal from an adverse decision rendered by a county court. "The
appeal of any minor from an order of adoption may be taken by any
person.... In all other cases the appeal of any minor or incompetent
person may be taken and prosecuted by his general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem.' 14 6 Both cases holding that a guardian ad litem has
the right to appeal involved probate matters. 47 The issue of the right
of a guardian ad litem to appeal from a circuit court seems never to
have been raised. But that the right exists seems indisputable.
By rule of the supreme court, applying alike to circuit and county
courts, "attorneys and guardians ad litem, appointed by the court be-
low, will be deemed to continue in service until the contrary appears. 11 4 8
A similar statutory provision governs the county court specifically.
"The guardian ad litem shall continue to act throughout the proceeding
in relation to the same estate or matter, until its final settlement or con-
clusion, unless otherwise ordered. In the discretion of the court, the
appointment may be revoked and another guardian ad litem ap-
pointed.' 149 Generally speaking, then, a guardian ad litem continues in
service until the matter for which he was appointed is finally settled'5 0
142 Tyson v. Tyson, 94 Wis. 225, 230, 68 N.W. 1015, 1016 (1896).
143 Wis. STAT. §48.88(3) (1963).
'144 Cf. Roberts v. Vaughn, 142 Tenn. 361, 219 S.W. 1034 (1920), 9 A.L.R. 1528.
145 Jolitz v. Graff, 12 Wis. 2d 52, 106 N.W. 2d 340 (1960).
146 Wis. STAT. §324.01 (1963).
'47 Jones v. Roberts, 96 Wis. 427, 70 N.W. 685 (1897) ; Tyson v. Tyson, 94 Wis.
225, 68 N.W. 1015 (1896).
148 Wis. STAT. §251.88 (1963), promulgated at 17 Wis. 2d xv (1963).
149 WIS. STAT. §32929 (1963).
15 0 Hubbard v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 104 Wis. 160, 80 N.W. 454 (1899). But see
Hicks v. Hicks, 79 Wis. 465, 48 N.W. 495 (1891), holding that a guardian
ad liten appointed for an incompetent defendant in a divorce action retained
his status in a petition for modification of the decree nine years later be-
cause he had never been formally discharged.
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(unless his ward's disability ends in the meantime'51 ), or until he is
discharged by the court if, for example, a conflict of interest arises.
Throughout his appointment, a guardian ad litem would do well
to keep in mind that a cause of action may lie for his negligence. For-
tunately, the only authority for the above statement is dicta: "While
the guardian ad litern is at all times under the control of and subject
to the orders of the court, the immediate responsibility for protecting
the infant's interest devolves upon the guardian ad litem. If he neglect
or fail in his duty in that regard. he is answerable in damages for
negligence."' 152
Essentially, the responsibility of a guardian ad litem to his ward
is very similar to the responsibility of any attorney toward his client.
His power to compromise is more limited in that it is subject to the
approval of the court, and, as a practical matter, his duty to safeguard
property belonging to the ward is quite limited in the sense that he
so seldom has any in his possession. His statutory duty to join in certain
consents'53 is, of course, unique. The possibility of being personally
liable for costs and negligence, he shares with all of us! And, with all
of us, his primary responsibility as an officer of the court is to protect
the rights of the person whom he is representing.
Compensation
The jungle of law relating to compensation can perhaps best be
explored by attempting to hew two separate paths-one entitled "Who
Pays ?" and the second, "How Much ?"
The first path has a relatively unentangled beginning. The county
has the duty to pay guardians ad litem under the Children's Code,'
the State Mental Health Act,1 5 and in actions to foreclose tax liens' 56
under procedures set forth in section 59.77. On petitions for a general
guardian, 57 as well as in actions affecting marriage (in which the
question of paternity is raised) and in paternity proceedings, 158 if the
proposed wards or parties to the proceeding are unable to compensate
the guardian ad litem, his fees are to be paid by the county according
to the method established in section 957.26.159
151 Tyson v. Tyron, 94 Wis. 225, 68 N.W. 1015 (1896).
"5' Will of Jaeger, 218 Wis. 1, 11, 259 N.W. 842, 846 (1935), 99 A.L.R. 738, 745,
paraphrasing Tyson v. Tyson, 94 Wis. 225, 229, 68 N.W. 1015, 1016 (1896).
153 See notes 136-39,supra.
154 Wis. STAT. §§48.02(8), .996 (1963).
155 WIS. STAT. §51.07 (1963).
156 Wis. STAT. §75.521 (1963).
15"7'Vis. STAT. §319.11 (1963).
158 WiS. STAT. §328.39 (1963).
59 Section 957.26 relates primarily to counsel for indigent defendants. only
the requirement of payment by the county and not the schedule of disburse-
ments as set forth therein, applies to guardians ad litem. Shewalter v. She-
walter, 259 Wis. 936, 49 N.W. 2d 727 (1951).
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In eminent domain proceedings, the condemnor is responsible for
the guardian ad litem's fee. 160
Emerging from the plateau of such special proceedings, we encoun-
ter the provision that guardian ad litem fees are to be allowed as costs. 6'
Thus, the fees may not be recovered as part of a direct money judg-
ment, but only as an item of taxable costs. 162 The rule was applied in a
federal court diversity case, brought in the Eastern District of Wis-
consin. 6 1. Judge Grubb looked to Wisconsin statutes sections 256.48,
271.04(2), and 269.80(3), and concluded that "this Wisconsin law
expresses a substantive policy of Wisconsin on a non-conventional item
of expense and consequently should be followed by this court in diversity
cases. Wisconsin by statute has expressly altered the ordinary, general
rule in cases of this sort, which would be to award the guardian ad litem
fees out of the fund recovered.' 6 4
The taxable cost rule is helpful insofar as it permits recovery from
an unsuccessful litigant, but it does not go so far as to allow recovery
by an unsuccessful guardian ad litem from a successful adversary. 65
Thus, if the guardian ad litem does not prevail, he may not look to the
opposing party for payment of his fee under section 271.04.6
Section 256.48 provides in part that
wherever the statutes do not specify who shall pay the fee of
the guardian ad litem, the court shall order payment of his
fees to be made by the party which the court determines should
bear this cost.1
67
However, not even such broad language may be used to tax the
fees of a guardian ad litem for a minor plaintiff against a successful
defendant in a personal injury action.16s "The litigation here is not in
the nature of a probate proceeding or a proceeding in rem. Because of
the indefiniteness of section 256.48,... where no standard is set up for
the court to determine who should bear the cost, it should not be applied
to burden the successful party with expenses of litigation because the
unsuccessful party has no funds to pay them.'
69
160 WIs. STAT. §32.05(4) (1963).
161 WIS. STAT. §271.04(2) (1963); cf. §269.80(3), which directs the court, in
minor settlements where the amount does not exceed $1,500, to "fix and
allow the expenses of the action, including . . . fees of guardian ad litem."162 Bey v. Transport Indem. Co., 23 Wis. 2d, 182, 127 N.W. 2d 251 (1964).
163 Gandall v. Fidelity & Gas Co., 158 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
164 Id. at 880-81.
'
65 Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d 163 (1959);
cf. Gandall v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. 158 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1958), in
which the court specifically reserved an opinion as to whether its holding
would apply if the question ad liten; did not prevail.166 Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 165.
167 This section was created as an amendment to a county court statute by Wis.
Laws 1953, ch. 107, and was originally numbered §324.29(2m). However, it
was renumbered by Wis. Laws 1955, ch. 165, and now applies to courts of
record generally, by virtue of its inclusion in title XXIV.168 Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d 163 (1959).
1 6 9 Id. at 359, 99 N.W. 2d at 171.
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The quoted reference to "a probate proceeding or a proceeding in
re;;" may well have been prompted by the guardian ad litem fee rules
applicable thereto. In order to understand the present law regulating
fees of guardians ad litem in probate proceedings, it is helpful to
stumble through its historical backgrounds.
Originally, guardian ad litein fees were payable from the corpus of
the estate, notwithstanding the ward's interest therein.7 0 This was evi-
dently based upon the theory that the ward who must appear in order
that the decree be binding on other parties, could appear only by guar-
dian ad litem.'7
However, such practice was ultimately condemned,172 and the
guardian ad litern was forced to look for compensation to only that
property belonging to his ward which was "actually recovered and
under the control of the court."'17 So if the ward had only a remainder
interest in the estate, part of the remainder interest had to be sold to
compensate the guardian ad litem.'7 4 Or, if the ward was given a specific
legacy, the fee was payable therefrom. 7 5 And if it were determined
that the ward had no interest, his guardian ad litern received no fee.'7 6
The guardian ad litern had a lien on the ward's interest to the extent
of his allowance, but could not recover compensation from the estate
at large. 7 7 At least part of the court's reasoning was based upon lack
of statutory authorization for the original practice. 7 8
Taking the hint thus provided, the legislature passed chapter 267
of the Laws of 1907, which provided that
a guardian ad litem appointed for an infant who is a necessary
party to a proceeding to probate a will, or in a proceeding or
action to construe a will, or in a proceeding in the settlement of
an estate, may be allowed compensation for his services and for
his necessary expenditures in the litigation, to be fixed by the
court, in which such proceedings or litigation is had, and paid
out of the body of the estate or property in controversy, if the
infant has no available property out of which such payment can
be directed by the court.'"
The new statute was upheld as constitutional on the theory that it
merely authorized payment from a general fund in custodia legia, in a
proceeding in rem where "guardians ad litem are as essential to parties
170 Ford v. Ford, 88 Wis. 122, 59 N.W. 464 (1894).
171 Ibid.
172 In re Donge's Estate, 103 Wis. 497, 79 N.W. 786 (1899).
173 Tyson v. Richardson, 103 Wis. 397, 401, 79 N.W. 439, 440 (1899).
4 Ibid.
175 Stephenson v. Norris, 128 Wis. 242, 107 N.W. 434 (1906).
176 Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 650 (1902).
177 Will of Korn, 128 Wis. 428, 107 N.W. 659 (1906); Stephenson v. Norris,
128 Wis. 242, 107 N.W. 434 (1906); Tyson v. Richardson, 103 Wis. 397, 79
N.W. 439 (1899).
178 Stephenson v. Norris, supra note 175; In re Donge's Estate, 103 Wis. 497,
79 N.W. 786 (1899).
179 WIs. STAT. §4041 b (1911).
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interested adversely to the infant as to the latter, since only by use
thereof could they succeed, safely, if at all, to the subject of the pro-
ceedings."'' s0 And since the statute was constitutional, the prescribed
method of payment was permissible, but only because of the "special
legislative authority."' 8'1 So, once again, a guardian ad litem could look
to the estate at large for payment of his fees, provided that his ward
had no other property from which the court could order payment. 8 2
Eventually the proviso was dropped,' 8 ' and the statute assumed its
present form:
A guardian ad litem for a necessary party to a proceeding to
probate a will, or in a proceeding to construe a will, or in a
proceeding in the settlement of an estate, may be allowed com-
pensation and his necessary expenditures, to be fixed by the
court, and paid out of the estate or property in controversy.3
8 4
Ordinarily, then, this section will protect guardians ad litem in
probate proceedings.-' However, a guardian ad litem for an unneces-
sary party still serves without fee'S--as, it appears, do those who rep-
resent unsuccessful wards in civil litigation. 8 7
Turning into our second path ("How Much?"), we encounter the
once firmly established judicial rule which pervades the entire subject
of the amount of compensation to which a guardian ad litem is entitled
if he finds someone to pay him.
The standard to be applied is not that which governs agreements
between a client who has the capacity to contract freely and at arms'
length with an attorney whom he has voluntarily chosen.8 8 Instead,
because an attorney as an officer of the court has the duty to serve as
18o Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 195, 118 N.W. 997, 1003 (1909), rehear-
ing denied on other grounds, 138 Wis. 179, 120 N.W. 288 (1909).
181 Ibid.,
182 Apparently, if the ward did have a present available interest in the estate, the
fee for his guardian ad litem could still be made a lien thereon. Estate of
Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N.W. 174 (1914).
183 Wis. Laws 1945, ch. 345.
184 WIs. STAT. §324.13(2) (1963). By analogy, this section was held to permit
recovery from the general estate by an attorney appointed under the Soldiers
and Sailors Civil Relief Act. In re Ehlke's Estate, 250 Wis. 583, 27 N.W. 2d,
754 (1947).
165 Cf. Will of Griffith, 165 Wis. 601, 163 N.W. 138 (1917). However, in order
to qualify for fees and reimbursements from the estate, the proceedings for
which the guardian ad litem is appointed evidently must be one specified in
the statute. One appointed in a proceeding to modify a trust agreement in
a divorce action was not entitled to recover compensation or disbursements
from the trust estate, for lack of the "special legislative authority" required
by the McNaughto, rule. Yates v. Yates, 165 Wis. 250, 161 N.W. 743 (1917).
18 Estate of Strange, 176 Wis. 2d 404, 97 N.W. 2d 99 (1959) ; In re Austin's
Estate, 258 Wis. 578, 46 N.W. 2d 861 (1951).
187 See note 165 supra.
188 "[Jjudicial officers perform their public duties 'for pecuniary rewards wholly
incommensurate to what the same industry, learning, and ability would have
commanded at the hands of clients.' It is upon such basis 'rather than with
private contract that compensation should be made in measuring the allow-
ance to' a guardian ad litem." Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 198, 118
N.W. 997, 1004 (1909).
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guardian ad litem when called, his measure of compensation should
be analogous to that of other officials performing public services.18 9
The term compensation as it applies to guardians ad litem has been de-
fined as "a reasonable charge, not measured by the high salaries or
rewards for services which large establishments and wealthy clients
may voluntarily pay to lawyers of their choice, but measured more
nearly by the compensation which the law allows to public officers
having similar duties. The reason is that guardians ad litem are in a
true sense public officers, and not merely that but public officers of
justice."190
Some statutes which specifically authorize payment of compensa-
tion set up a standard of reasonableness. 19 1 Section 256.48 does more
than establish such a standard, however, for it provides that a guardian
ad litem "shall be allowed reasonable compensation for his services,
reasonable compensation to be such as is customarily charged by attor-
neys in this state for comparable services. 192
The Wisconsin Supreme Court had occasion to construe the above
rule in Blasi v. Drafzt9' in which the trial court awarded minor plain-
tiff's guardian ad litem a fee "in the amount of 33% per cent of the face
amount of the judgment in favor of" the minor plaintiff against the
defendant. On appeal, the percentage base was upheld,194 and the court
enunciated the following guidelines:
In setting the amount of the guardian ad litem fees under [section
256.48], it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider [11 the
189 "A duty of public service without such compensation as would be demanded
for similar labors for individuals rests upon all members of the community.
... Especially has been recognized from earliest times the duty of lawyers
to aid their courts in the protection of the helpless or the oppressed without
thought of pecuniary benefit. . . . At it would be the duty of an attorney,
however eminent, to defend one accused of crime for the very moderate
compensation now fixed by statute, or for none at all if none were allowed;
as it is the duty, and . . . the custom, of attorneys to serve the court in dis-
barment proceedings without compensation, so it is a professional duty to aid
the court as guardian ad liteim, either without compensation if the case re-
quires it, or, when funds exist, for compensation to be measured by the
standard of official emluments, rather than by that of the highest prices
demanded and paid between individuals free to contract as they will." Rich-
ardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 578-79, 86 N.W. 250, 259 (1901).
190 Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 314, 144 N.W. 174, 181 (1914).191 WIs. STAT. §§32.05 (condemnation under right of eminent domain; "reason-
able fees of such special guardian"), 48.02 (Children's Code; "reasonable
compensation"), 48.996 (Interstate Compact on Juveniles, under Children's
Code; "reasonable fee"), 51.07 (commitment or discharge proceedings under
State Mental Health Act; "reasonable charge") (1963).
192 For history of this section, see note 167 supra.
193 12 Wis. 2d 14, 106 N.W. 2d 307 (1960).
194 "We see no abuse of discretion in basing the fees in this instance on the
amount of [the judgment]. But such a basis is not a rule to be followed in
all situations since, under a number of circumstances, its application would
bring about absurd and inequitable results .... It may be observed, however,
that had the court specified the amount of the fees allowed rather than a
percentage of the minor's recovery from respondents, the question here
presented would not have arisen." Id. at 20, 106 N.W. 2d at 310
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amount of the minor's recovery, [2] the proportion of his negli-
gence, [3] the amount of contribution, if any, [4] the time spent
and the effort and diligence exercised on the minor's behalf by
the guardian ad litern, as well as [5] the customary charges of
attorneys in Wisconsin for comparable services.19
Nowhere in the Blasi case is there a reference to the standard es-
tablished by Will of McNaughton, 9 Richardson v. Tyson,'19 7 and Estate
of Wells."" However, in the Blasi case, the guardian ad litem also
served as attorney of record for the plaintiff-a fact which should
probably be recognized in applying the guidelines set down therein.
The court has yet to hold that section 256.48 abrogates its long es-
tablished standard and demands application of the minimum bar fee
schedule. 9 9 Authority for denying application of the full minimum bar
fee rates to guardian ad litem fees may be found in recent cases in-
volving fees for counsel for indigent defendants. These cases also il-
lustrate that the norm to be applied to determine "customary charges
for comparable services" is that measuring the compensation of other
guardians ad litem.
Conway v. Sauk County200 is one such case. The court was called
upon to determine the amount of the fee payable under section 256.49,
which requires that compensation for court-appointed attorneys "shall
be such as is customarily charged by attorneys in this state for com-
parable services." Writing for the court, Justice Fairchild said that
"apparently the legislature considered that the former specific limita-
tions [201] provided inadequate compensation for services of court-ap-
pointed counsel and the legislature accordingly authorized the appoint-
ing court to fix a fee which would be fair and reasonable for the services
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. '" 202 Even under the
statute, the court reserved the right to determine the character and
extent of the services for which the attorney was entitled to compensa-
tion. The rate applied thereto at the request of the attorney, and upheld
on appeal, was two-thirds of the minimum bar fee schedule.203 The su-
195 Ibid.
196 Note 188 supra.
197 Note 189 supra.
198 Note 190 supra.
199 Evidently the issue has not been raised. (Hopefully, this report will not
operate as a catalyst.)
200 19 Wis. 2d 599, 120 N.W. 2d 671 (1963).
201 Section 957.26 had provided that counsel for indigents receive a maximum
of "$25 for each half day in court, $15 for each half day of preparation not
exceeding 5 days, $15 for each half day attending at the taking of deposi-
tions. .. " This was changed by Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 500, to provide for com-
pensation "pursuant to [section] 256.49." Wis. STAT. §957.26 (1963).202 Conway v. Sauk County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 603, 120 N.W. 2d 671, 674 (1963).
203 "The schedule of minimum fees of the State Bar or other bar associations
constitutes only the collective judgment of the committees or groups that
passed upon it as to a scale of fees generally fair for the types of services
listed. They are some evidence relative to the question of a reasonable charge
for services, but have no other legal force." Id. at 604, 120 N.W. 2d at 675.
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preme court found no abuse of discretion since the allowance was not
"clearly unreasonable." 20 4
In Schwartz v. Rock County20 5 (another indigent defendant case),
the parties had evidently stipulated that full minimum bar fees be
allowed, but the trial court reduced the appointed attorney's compensa-
tion to two-thirds thereof. In affirming, the supreme court said:
It is urged that [section] 256.49 ... requires this court to
apply the full minimum bar rates to services rendered by court-
appointed counsel. . . . We do not construe this section as re-
quiring the application of the full minimum rates of the State
Bar of Wisconsin. The going rate for representation of indigents
in Rock County is two-thirds of the minimum bar rates. Such
practice is prevalent in other parts of Wisconsin and is used as a
guide line in allowing compensation to counsel appointed by this
court for indigents. We find no error in the rate used by the
trial court. 2
°6
Thus, the indigent defendant cases, decided under a statute almost
identical to section 256.48, may well provide the authority for keeping
guardian ad litem fees at rates less than those prescribed by the mini-
mum bar fee schedule.
The court came perilously close to the issue in a personal injury
action against a minor driver and his insurance carrier. 20 7 The attorney
for the insurance company was appointed guardian ad litem for the
minor defendant. Judgment went in favor of the minor against an im-
pleaded third party, and the attorney requested a guardian ad litem fee
of $300, the per diem rate for a two-day circuit court trial as established
by the minimum bar fee schedule. The fee was disallowed on the theory
that his duties as guardian ad litem were coincidental to the duties owed
to the carrier to defend its assured and that no additional service as a
guardian ad litem was actually rendered. The court held that the intent
of the legislature in enacting section 256.48 was not to allow double
recovery in such circumstances. However, again without reference to
the old rule requiring fees similar to those of other public servants,
and by way of dicta, Justice Hallows said that
[section] 256.48... contemplates a guardian ad litem who actu-
ally performs legal services in that capacity. Otherwise, there is
no purpose in defining a reasonable fee based on legal services.
Before the creation of this section of the statutes some sections
provided for appointment of guardians ad [item but no require-
ment existed that they be attorneys, and in some, no provision
was made for the payment of fees. The intent of [section] 256.48
was to assure attorneys who were appointed guardian ad litem
204The Conway case expresses a warning that court-appointed counsel seek
permission before making "substantial disbursements" lest they be disallowed.
20524 Wis. 2d 172, 128 N.W. 2d 450 (1964).
206 Id. at 180, 128 N.W. 2d at 455.
207 Dickman v. Schaeffer, 10 Wis. 2d 610, 103 N.W. 2d 922 (1960).
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that they would be paid the customary legal fees for legal
services. 208
However, what the court will do with the old rule if and when the
issue is properly presented remains speculative.
It adhered strictly thereto vhen it was faced with the construction
of section 324.13(2) in its original form.20 9 The language of the statute
was and is discretionary, and the court refused to construe it as manda-
tory.210 Furthermore, since the section, then as well as now, provided
no basis for compensation-not even the use of the word reasonable -2 1
the court applied its old standard in determining the amount of fees to
be awarded thereunder. "It is quite manifest that a basis of compensa-
tion, as in ordinary cases between party [sic] and client, was not
thought of. That would be contrary to the standard in that regard for
guardians ad litern in general and particularly in this state. The rule
was firmly established here long before the law was passed that the
basis should be that ordinarily paid to compensate for official services
of a somewhat similar character. 'l 2 12
The distinction between sections 324.13(2) and 256.48 is also "quite
manifest." An additional problem is raised by the fact that section 324.13
applies to probate proceedings in county courts, as did section 256.48
originally, but now section 256.48 relates to courts of record generally.21 3
To hold that section 256.48 requires application of minimum bar
fee rates to guardians ad litem in probate proceedings would do more
than abolish our once firmly-established judicial rule. Since the fees
may evidently be charged against the corpus of an estate,214 it would
also overturn the many cases in which the court has recognized its duty
to preserve funds within its control.
21 5
In reliance upon one or both of these two principles, the supreme
court has several times been forced to reduce guardian ad litem fees.
Attorneys testifying for the guardian ad litem in the Tyson cases
208 Id. at 619, 103 N.W. 2d at 927.
209 Note 179 supra.
210 Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 118 N.W. 997 (1909). The statute pro-
vides that a guardian ad litern "may be allowed compensation"; while under
§256.48 he "shall be allowed reasonable compensation." In Blasi v. Drafz,
the court made the unsupported statement that "[section 256.48] makes the
allowance of fees discretionary with the trial court." 12 Wis. 2d at 20, 106
N.W. 2d at 310 (1960). This was evidently meant to refer to amount of
compensation.
211 Other statutes authorizing payment of compensation to a guardian ad litem
are similarly devoid of any reference to a standard to be applied. Wis. STAT.
§§75.521 (foreclosure of tax liens), 319.11 (petition for general guardian),
329.38 (paternity proceedings) (1963).
212 Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 198, 118 N.W. 997, 1004 (1909).
213 See note 167 supra.
214 Note 184 supra.
215 E.g., Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 118 N.W. 997 (1909) ; Richardson
v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 86 N.W. 250 (1901); In re Donge's Estate, 103 Wis.
497, 79 N.W. 786 (1899).
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estimated the value of his services at $5,000.216 But he recovered only
half of that, not only because the estimates were evidently based on
the present value of the estate rather than upon the wards' remainder
interests, but also because the court apparently felt that the recom-
mended amount corresponded too closely to the going rate for attorneys'
fees. "Such however, is not the true rule as to compensation of court
officers .... "217
In the McNaughton case, attorneys for the other parties agreed to a
guardian ad litem fee of $3,000, which the supreme court reduced to
$500. "The case did not involve any very intricate questions of law nor
any of fact as regards methods of proof. The rules to be followed in
the litigation were substantially removed from all uncertainties by many
decisions of this court. . . . The property involved consisted of some-
where about $40,000 money value, but the work was neither more nor
less because of the magnitude of the estate, though, of course, the
responsibility was, by reason of that feature, somewhat enhanced."",,
Furthermore, the agreement with the attorneys was not binding be-
cause none of them had power to stipulate away the trust funds.
A similar agreement was struck down as constituting a waste of
trust funds where the stipulated guardian ad litem fees again exceeded
the amounts which the court considered adequate.2 19
In Estate of Wells,220 the court relied upon the rule that compensa-
tion be based upon that awarded to public officers. With little discussion
other than the statement of the rule, it reduced fees for the guardians
ad litenL from $33 to $15 per day of trial and from $17.50 to $10 per
day of work outside court.2
21
Thus is the law with respect to guardian ad litem fees far from
clear-cut. However, it would seem that the more troublesome problems
could be overcome by statutory authorization for payment of allowable
fees and expenses to unsuccessful guardians ad litem by counties and
by a fee schedule applicable to guardians ad litem.
Recommendations
No simple solution suggests itself with respect to the major problems
surrounding the necessity and compensation of guardians ad litem3.22
216Richardson v. Tyson, 110 Wis. 572, 86 N.W. 250 (1901).
217 Id. at 588, 86 N.W. at 255.
218 Will of McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 200, 118 N.W. 997, 1005 (1909). The
trial had lasted eight days, with an estimated preparation time of from ten
to twenty days. The court noted that counsel for indigent defendants were
being paid $15 per day.
219 Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956 (1912).
220 156 Wis. 294, 144 N.W. 174 (1914).
221 Cf. Will of McNaughton, supra note 218.
222 That a guardian ad litem, when one be necessary, should be an attorney
seems sound in light of his requisite knowledge of legal rights and duties.
In this regard, the nature and extent of his responsibility is basically similar
to that of any attorney representing any client and little change in the exist-
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In some ways it would seem best that appointment be discretionary
with the trial judge.2 3 This could be done either through adoption of a
statute modelled after Federal Rule 17(c), or by the amendment of
existing statutes."' If the former method were adopted, the new statute
should probably be placed in title XXIV, so that it would apply to all
courts of record, and should be broad enough to include not only pro-
bate proceedings, but other special proceedings such as adoption and
land condemnation. In either event, all subservient statutes should be
amended so as to conform to the controlling ones-which, at the very
least, represents a major statutory revision.
The other practical objection is that of the additional burden on the
trial judges to make the necessary determination. The safe and easy
way out for them would be to continue to appoint guardians ad litem
for every minor and mentally incompetent person who appears before
them. Thus, the discretionary element could be defeated as a matter
of practice.
The controlling objection, however, appears to be the legislative and
judicial policy as declared in this state. That policy indicates a strong
awareness of the necessity to protect the rights of persons under dis-
ability, and to that extent should not be discouraged. The scale tips
far in its favor even when weighed against the expense incurred when
it appears ex post facto in some instances that protection would have
been adequate without a guardian ad litem.
For these reasons, mandatory appointment is recommended. 25 To
effectuate this end, and to avoid confusion, statutes which appear to
make appointment discretionary should be amended.2 6
Furthermore, section 260.22 should be amended to provide that a
party under disability "appear and conduct or defend" by the general
guardian of his property or by his guardian ad litem, so as to conform
to section 324.29, governing county courts. And section 324.29 should
probably be amended to provide for appointment of a guardian ad litem
ing law seems indicated. However, if there be any doubt that a guardian
ad litern has the right to appeal from a circuit court to the supreme court,
statutory provision should be made or rule of court promulgated. In addi-
tion, it might be well to adopt the practice of discharging a guardian ad
litem formally and of record when his duties are finished. This protection
could be prescribed by statute or rule of court, but, especially in light of
Hicks v. Hicks, supra note 150, it seems a wise precaution.
223 However, in any situation in which a guardian ad litern is required to join
in the consent of his ward, notes 136-38 supra, or of other parties, note 139
supra, appointment would, of course, be mandatory.
224 If a test similar to that under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (see note 90 supra) were
adopted, certainly any party under disability would be adequately protected.
225 No opinion is expressed as to the advisibility of requiring or permitting
appointments in proceedings before the Industrial Commission.
26 WIs STAT. §§48.25, .88, .991, 51.02, 319.11 (1963). The discretionary language
of §269.80 has apparently been made mandatory by judicial construction. See
note 67 supra. The discretion in §§256.52 (guardian ad litem for persons not
in being or presently unascertainable) and 323.10 (possible persons unborn
or presently unascertainable) should probably be retained.
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"when the court or judge has reason to believe that a party is mentally
incompetent to have charge of his affairs" so as to conform to section
260.22.
No matter which policy is pursued, those statutes which provide for
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor, but omit reference to
an incompetent,2 27 should be revised to include both..2
28
Very likely, the recommendation that appointments be mandatory
is no more than that status quo be maintained, and hence should repre-
sent no appreciable increase in cost.
However, the radical suggestions resulting from this study concern
cost, and are two-fold. It seems as unfair that a guardian ad litem
should serve without fee (and possibly incur liability for costs), as it
does that he be awarded a fee which over-compensates his time and
responsibility.
With all due respect for the philosophy which requires an attorney
to serve as guardian ad litem as an adjunct to his professional eminence,
it does not seem unreasonable that the government which compels the
performance of his duty be authorized to compensate him therefore-
win, lose, or draw.1
2 9
Under existing rules, and the continuation thereof herewith pro-
posed, a judge is required to appoint a guardian ad litent when it ap-
pears that a minor or mentally incompetent person has an interest in
the action or proceeding. If, after the fact, it appears that he had none,
230
the responsibility of his guardian ad litem is not thereby diminished.
And, whether the proceeding binds other parties depends upon the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. Therefore, it would seem neither
unconstitutional nor inequitable if an organ of the government were
required to compensate him. Thus, it is recommended that the county
in which the proceeding is brought have the duty to reimburse a guardian
ad litem for his expenses (at the very least) and to pay his fee (prefer-
ably), if no other party or fund be liable therefor under other pro-
visions of the law.
231
The amount of such fee is the subject of the second radical sug-
gestion. Many judges who responded to the survey 23 2 indicated a desire
227 WIS. STAT. §§48.84, 315.04 (1963).
22SThe provisions of chapter 52 regulating paternity suits prescribe that a
guardian ad litem be appointed for a minor or incompetent mother, but make
no mention of one for a minor or incompetent father or child. Perhaps this
should also be changed.
229 Of course, some statutes already provide for payment by the county. See
notes 154-58 supra.
230 If, for example, it were determined that the ward had not been a necessary
party, see note 186 supra, or if the guardian ad litem were unsuccessful in
establishing his ward's rights, see note 165 supra.
231 This would apply to situations mentioned in note 226 supra, and would pre-
sumably abrogate the necessity of written consent by a guardian ad litem for
a plaintiff, see note 19 supra. No estimate of possible cost to counties has been
made.
232 Results of the survey are summarized in the appendix to this report.
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that a standard be established for compensation of guardians ad litern.
Although it is recommended that a guardian ad litem not be ,required
to serve without fee, no inference is intended that he be compensated
at fees similar to those for attorneys serving private clients. Serve he
does, and should be paid, but he serves as one whose license to practice
makes him eligible and whose principal has little or no choice in his
selection.
Thus, it is recommended that a fee schedule applicable to guardians
ad litem be adopted, and that such schedule be the equivalent of from
fifty to sixty-five per cent of the minimum bar fee schedule 3 Further-
more, it is strongly urged that in order to qualify for court approval
of compensation, all guardians ad litem be required to submit a verified
statement of the tiie and duties for which they are seeking payment.23 4
This would seem to insure both that guardians ad litem entitled
thereto be adequately compensated and, on the other hand, that ap-
pointment as guardian ad litem not serve as a bonanza to one who
expends little or no time thereon.
With these observations, this study closes-in the hope that it has
not only presented an expos6 of the existing law, but that it will be
helpful in formulating future policies.
APPENDIX
As an adjunct to the study of the law of guardians ad litem in Wisconsin,
a questionnaire was sent to all the circuit and county court judges in Wisconsin.
The purpose of the questionnaire was to determine how the guardian ad litem
statutes were applied in the various state courts. A consensus of judicial opinion
as to present and future guardian ad litem procedures was also requested. Un-
fortunately, the response to our questionnaire was limited and unenthusiastic
(only 51% answered the questionnaire), so that it is impossible to draw any
useful conclusions from the survey. Only the results of the survey will be
stated, since only 83 of the 160 questionnaires sent out were returned and of
those 83, very few had answered all the questions contained therein.
Questionnaire
1. Do you use any list or formal source for making appointments of guardians
ad litem?
Circuit Courts: Yes 5 No 17
County Courts: Yes 21 No 40
Total: Yes 26 No 57
If so, of what is the list or source composed? Total replies 26.
Usually, the attorney selected to be a guardian ad litem was selected
from an alphabetical list of attorneys, such as the bar association directory
or telephone directory.
233 Some attorneys consulted felt that two-thirds of the minimum bar fees would
be fair; others thought it high. The schedule should probably include mini-
mums and maximums. Unless the guardian ad litem is also attorney for his
ward in a cause traditionally compensated on a percentage basis, his fee should
be based strictly on time expended.
234 Statutes specifically allowing fees for guardians ad litem could be amended
so as to incorporate the schedule by reference. Those statutes which establish
a standard of "reasonableness," see note 191 supra, as well as those which
omit any such frame of reference, see note 211 supra, could be similarly
amended.
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2. Do you have direct knowledge of the legal abilities of the attorneys whom
you appoint?
Circuit Courts: Always 9; usually 13; about one-half the time -; oc-
casionally -; never-.
County Courts: Always 46; usually 15; about one-half the time -; oc-
casionally - ; never- .
Total: Always 55; usually 28; about one-half the time _; occasionally -;
never-
3. Does your method of selection vary with the type of issue involved?
Circuit Courts: Yes 17 No. 4
County Courts: Yes 40 No 18
Total: Yes 57 No 22
If so, what is the basis for your distinction? Total replies 53
The attorney nominated by the judge to be the guardian ad litem depends
upon the nature of the case, the amount involved, the experience of the at-
torney and the ability of the attorney as a trial lawyer.
4. In approximately what percentage of cases does a minor request a specific
person to be appointed as his guardian ad litern?
Circuit Courts: 0-24% 11; 25-49% 1;
50-74% 2; 75-100% 5;
County Courts: 0-24% 42; 25-49% _;
50-74% 8 ; 75-100% 2.
Total: 0-24% 53; 25-49% 1;
50-74% 10; 75-100% 7.
Do you honor such requests?
Circuit Courts: Always 1; usually 9; about one-half the time -; occa-
sionally _; never 7.
County Courts: Always 5; usually 27; about one-half the time __; occa-
sionally 3; never 4.
Total: Always 6; usually 36; about one-half the time _; occasionally
_; never 11.
5. Do you favor the practice of appointing the attorney retained to represent
the ward as guardian ad litem,?
Circuit Courts: Always 3; usually 10; about one-half the time 1; occa-
sionally 3 ; never 4.
County Courts: Always 11; usually 29; about one-half the time 3; occa-
sionally 9; never 3.
Total: Always 14; usually 39; about one-half the time 4; occasionally 12;
never 7.
Explain: Total replies 54.
This procedure seems to be acceptable as long as the judge is certain
that no conflict of interest will arise.
6. Do you appoint a guardian ad lit em for a minor defendant who has ade-
quate and uncontested insurance coverage?
Circuit Courts: Always 19; usually _; about one-half the time _; occa-
sionally 1; never 1.
County Courts: Always 20; usually 16; about one-half the time 1; occa-
sionally 5; never 7.
Total: Always 39; usually 16; about one-half the time 1; occasionally 6;
never 8.
7. Have you ever had occasion to appoint a substitute guardian ad litem during
the course of any proceeding?
Circuit Courts: Yes 14 No 8
County Courts: Yes 27 No 33
Total: Yes 41 No 41
If so, under what circumstances? Total replies 40
The most frequent circumstances are (1) the guardian ad litem's in-
ability to continue to serve because of sickness or death, or (2) a conflict
of interest when he is serving both as attorney for one of the parties and
as guardian ad litem.
8. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 256.48, in your opinion is it
atways necessary that a guardian ad litem be an attorney?
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Circuit Courts: Yes 20 No 1
County Courts: Yes 53 No 8
Total: Yes 73 No 9
If not, please explain briefly under what circumstances a lay person might
serve, indicating any possible relationship betveen the guardian and ward
(i.e., parent and child, husband and wife, general guardian and ward, etc.).
Total replies 14
A lay person may in some cases be better qualified to act as guardian
ad litem if no conflict of interest will arise and if such lay person is a
relative. Furthermore, an attorney is more expensive than an adult relative
of the disabled party. Many of the "explanations" were non-responsive and
indicated a misunderstanding of the question.
9. In your opinion are there circumstances under which the judge alone might
adequately protect the interests of a minor or incompetent litigant?
Circuit Courts: Yes 5 No 16
County Courts: Yes 23 No 37
Total: Yes 28 No 43
Explain: Some judges feel that a minor could be adequately protected by
the judge in juvenile cases. However, the majority of the judges feel that
the trial judge would have difficulty remaining impartial if he were the
only person protecting the interests of the minor.
10. Would you favor absolute discretion in the presiding judge as to:
(a) Necessity of appointment?
Circuit Courts: Yes 8 No 13
County Courts: Yes 23 No 33
Total: Yes 31 No 46
Explain: Total replies 46
Most judges are not in favor of any judicial discretion as to the neces-
sity of appointment of a guardian ad litem because they are not aware of all
the facts before the trial commences. Several judges stated that an absolute
rule requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem protects the judge
from an abuse of discretion. However, a few judges did express the view
that there are cases when a guardian is simply not necessary.
(b) Qualifications of appointee (i.e., attorney, parent, spouse, general
guardian, etc.) ?
Circuits Courts: Yes 14 No 6
County Courts: Yes 46 No 7
Total: Yes 60 No 13
Explain: Total replies 55
Most of the comments expressed the desire that the status quo be main-
tained by requiring that a guardian ad litem be an attorney. The judges
feel that unless the case is quite simple and routine, the guardian ad litem
should be an attorney to prevent the responsibility of protecting the minor
from shifting to the judge and to prevent the delay which would ensue were
the judge required to educate a lay guardian ad liten.
11. Do you permit a guardian ad litem:
(a) To examine and cross examine witnesses?
Circuit Courts: Always 13; usually 3; about one-half the time 1; occasion-
ally 2; never 2.
County Courts: Always 52; usually 4; about one-half the time _; occa-
sionally 3; never
Total: Always 65; usually 7; about one-half the time 1; occasionally 5;
never 2.
Explain: Total replies 56.
The judges feel that the guardian ad litem has a duty to cross-examine
witnesses "when the circumstances require it." Often it is necessary for the
guardian ad litem to obtain judicial permission to cross-examine witnesses.
(b) To submit other evidence?
Circuit Courts: Always 11; usually 2; about one-half the time _; occa-
sionally 2; never 3.
County Courts: Always 49; usually 9; about one-half the time 1; occa-
sionally 4; never -
Total: Always 60; usually 11; about one-half the time 1; occasionally 6;
never 3.
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Explain: Total replies 53
Same answer as 11 (a) above.
12. When a party united in interest is represented by separate counsel (as in
insurance cases, for example), are the duties of a guardian ad litem merely
routine?
Circuit Courts: Always 2; usually 13; about one-half the time 3; occa-
sionally 2; never .
County Courts: Always 5; usually 34; about one-half the time 4; occa-
sionally 4; never 6.
Total: Always 7; usually 47; about one-half the time 7; occasionally 6;
never 6.
What circumstances render the duties more than mere routine?
Total replies 40
Problem here seems to arise when there is a question as to damages.
For example, the parent might disagree with the guardian ad litem as to the
proper amount of a settlement, or sometimes the possibility exists that
damages might exceed the coverage.
13. Has a guardian ad litem ever retained separate counsel to represent him or
his ward?
Circuit Courts: Yes 2 No 20
County Courts: Yes 6 No 51
Total: Yes 8 No 71
If so, approximately what percentage of cases? 1%
Do you or would you, require him to seek your approval before doing so?
Circuit Courts: Yes 7 No 2
County Courts: Yes 19 No 7
Total: Yes 26 No 9
14. Please describe briefly the method you use in determining how much a
guardian ad litem should be paid for his services in the following cases:
Total
(a) Tort Actions
Basis Number of Judges
Using Each Basis
Time 42
Responsibility 6
Amount 27
Bar Schedule 24
Other 17
(b) Real property actions or proceedings
Basis Number of Judges
Using Each Basis
Time 33
Responsibility 5
Amount 21
Bar Schedule 15
Other 12
(c) Probate proceedings
Basis Number of Judges
Using Each Basis
Time 29
Responsibility 3
Amount 12
Bar Schedule 15
Other 14
(d) Other
Basis Number of Judges
Using Each Basis
Time 27
Responsibility 3
Amount 8
Bar Schedule 19
Other 17
15. Is the amount of compensation at all dependent upon the amount recovered
by, or preserved for, the ward?
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Circuit Courts: Yes 16 No 6
County Courts: Yes 38 No 18
Total: Yes 54 No 24
Explain: Total replies 54
Judges feel that although the fee of the guardian ad litern should not
be based on the amount of recovery, it is obvious that this result cannot
be avoided, since it is impossible to award a $1,000 fee to the guardian
ad litent where the recovery was $800. The view is also expressed that the
fee of the guardian ad litem should be greater when the amount recovered
is more, because the guardian ad litern has a greater responsibility in cases
involving large amounts of money. Most of the judges agree that the amount
recovered for the ward is only one of many elements to consider when de-
termining the fee for the guardian ad litem.
16. In settlements of causes in which an insurance company compensates a
minor or an incompetent, does the insurance company pay the guardian
ad litem's fee in addition to the award?
Circuit Courts: Always 6; usually 11; about one-half the time 2; occasion-
ally 2; never
County Courts: Always 15; usually 27; about one-half the time 2; occasion-
ally 5; never 3.
Total: Always 21; usually 38; about one-half the time 4; occasionally 7;
never 3.
17. When an insurance company agrees to pay a guardian ad litem's fee in addi-
tion to the award, do you review the amount of the fee?
Circuit Courts: Always 14; usually 3; about one-half the time -; occa-
sionally 2; never 1.
County Courts: Always 27; usually 11; about one-half the time -; occa-
sionally 4; never 8.
Total: Always 41; usually 14; about one-half the time __; occasionally 6;
never 9.
Explain: Total replies 43
Generally there is no review of such fees unless they are unusually high
or low. Several judges will review the guardian ad litem fee to be certain
that there is no evidence of divided loyalty by the guardian ad litem be-
tween the minor and the party paying the fee.
18. Is a guardian ad litem for an unsuccessful litigant ever compensated for his
services if the ward has no property of his own, in the following cases:
(a) Tort actions? Yes 11 No 42
If so, when and how? Total replies 14
If his appearance is necessary, the guardian ad litem may receive com-
pensation out of the proceeds. Some judges claim that insurance companies
should reimburse an unsuccessful guardian ad litem.
(b) Real property actions or proceedings? Yes 19 No 30
If so, when and how? Total replies 18
Allowed if there is real property that can be reached.
(c) Probate proceedings? Yes 24 No 8
If so, when and how? Total replies 28
it seems that judges do award the guardian ad litem his fee out of the
estate rather freely.
(d) Other? Yes 21 No 15
If so, when and how? Total replies 21
Some judges feel that the guardian ad litem should be compensated if
through no fault of his own there is no recovery.
19. Is a guardian ad litem for an unsuccessful litigant ever reimbursed for his
expenditures?
Circuit Courts: Yes 10 No 8
County Courts: Yes 28 No 7
Total: Yes 38 No 15
If so, by whom? Total replies 32
Usually the guardian is without expenditures, because such expenses
are taken care of by the attorney for the minor or the parent of the
minor. Frequently, the insurance company will pay these expenses. A few
judges will place this expense upon the party which secured appointment of
the guardian ad litem.
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20. Would you favor consolidation of the existing statutory and case law-in
Wisconsin into a Guardian ad Litem Code?
Circuit Courts: Yes 9 No 9
County Courts: Yes 32 No 16
Total: Yes 41 No 25
If so, what would you like included therein? Total replies 31
Almost all the circuit court judges do not want any change in the law
concerning guardians ad litem. However, many county court judges request
(1). a guide which may be used to determine fees, (2) more clarification
of discretion areas, and (3) a statutory proclamation of the duties, re-
sponsibilities, authority and liability of the guardian ad litem.
21. In this, the final question, the judges were asked for suggestions for chang-
ing or improving the existing system.
Total replies 18
Several judges simply stated that the present system needed reform but
a far greater number of judges claimed that they experienced no problem
under the present system. Various suggestions as stated by the judges were:(1) a statute establishing specific fees for the guardian ad litem when
public funds are involved, (2) a court rule to standardize procedure through-
out the state, (3) repeal of section 269.80, and (4) an increase of the
amount stated in sections 269.80(3) and 319.04 to $2,500 or more.
